INTRODUCTION
The safety instrumented systems (SIS) play a major part in industrial risk management as safety barriers. A SIS aims at performing at least one safety function to achieve or maintain a safe state of equipment under control (EUC), in respect of a specific hazardous event. Due to the critical role of SIS for health, environment, and goods, functional safety standards have been developed as, for example, the IEC 61508 [1] and the ANSI/ISA S84.00.01-2004 [2] . A framework is then introduced to consider the overall system and software safety lifecycle and some requirements aim at avoiding the systematic failures. In the realization phase, the safety integrity level (SIL) is determined with respect to the random hardware failures. For a SIS operating in a low demand mode (i.e. the safety function is only performed on demand, and not more than once per year), the used criterion is the average probability of system failure to perform its safety function on demand. It corresponds to the mean system unavailability, calculated on the full test time interval, and denoted PFDavg.
According to IEC 61508 [1] and to the assumptions given afterwards, different characteristics have to be taken into account for PFDavg assessment: system architecture, failure rates, proof test intervals and effectiveness. In the present paper, a proof test is described as "partial" if it is imperfect, that is, it is able to detect only some system failures and leave the others latent. Visual inspections and partial stroke testing are examples of such partial tests. When a proof test is perfect (i.e. its effectiveness is equal to one), it is described as "full" and refers to overhauls which restore the system to an as good as new condition. Even if partial tests are less effective, they can be preferred to the full tests for several reasons:
• Full tests are generally physical (e.g. stimulation of sensing elements), costly and time consuming. They may sometimes be substituted by electronic tests (e.g. electronic simulation) but do not cover all the failures.
• Full tests often imply stopping production (e.g. power supply cut, flow stop by safety valves), sometimes unacceptable for industrialists. Partial tests (e.g. quarterturn valve closure) are therefore preferred.
• Some safety devices cannot be fully tested without degradations or destructions (e.g. one shot devices).
• Only real conditions testing can pretend to be full and, in many cases, may provoke more hazards than prevention (e.g. fire, toxic gas, or overpressure detection). Methods for PFDavg assessment are mentioned in [1] (e.g. fault trees, reliability block diagrams, Markov models) but none of them is prescribed. These techniques are compared and discussed in [3] - [5] . For example, a Markov model is used in [6] and reliability block diagrams in [7] , but both of them ignore the partial tests. The use of such tests can be regarded as a kind of imperfect preventive maintenance. Various methods and optimal policies for imperfect maintenance have been discussed in [8] . For example, some approaches set a constant probability that a preventive maintenance is perfect or imperfect [9] - [10] .
More specifically, a probability that a failure remained undiscovered after testing is assumed in [11] , but only for a single unit. References [3] - [4] claim that enhanced Markov analyses cover most aspects relevant for safety quantification. The use of Markov models is also defended in [5] . Because partial and full tests usually occur at deterministic time instants (e.g. periodically), basic Markov models are not appropriate [12] and extended Markov models have been developed [12] - [14] . Similar approaches have been used for cost optimization [15] .
In the present paper, a set of general formulas, given in a neat form and easy to compute, has been obtained by analytical approaches. These expressions are proposed to assess the availability of MooN architecture (i.e. k-out-of-n) systems made up by homogeneous components (i.e. components with identical failure rates), and subject to partial and full tests. The partial tests may occur at different time instants (periodic or not), up to the full test. Section 2 presents the assumptions, notations, and formulas. An application is then given in Section 3 for parameter estimations, PFDavg assessment, and optimization of the partial test distribution.
PFD ASSESSMENT

General Assumptions
• All failures taken into account are dangerous and only detected by partial or full tests.
• The system is made up by N components which are independent and have identical and constant failure rates.
• The system has a MooN architecture i.e. it is made up by N components and it is able to perform its safety function if any M or more components among N are in an operating state (i.e. M-out-of-N system).
• The N components of the system are in an operating state at time t 0 . • The partial tests are able to detect only some specific failures of each component of the system. • The full tests are able to detect all the failures of each component of the system. • All components are tested together during any test.
• When a failure is detected by a partial or a full test, it is repaired immediately. During test and maintenance actions, measures are performed to maintain the EUC in a safe state in such a way that any test or maintenance duration is not included in the analyses.
• After each full test, the system is restored to an as good as new condition. The PFDavg can therefore be assessed according to the full test time interval. 
Notations
MooN system architecture, with M ≤ N λ failure rate of any of the N components which compose the system A e (t) availability function of any of the N components which compose the system i.e. probability that the component is in an operating state at time t A(t) availability function of the system i.e. probability that the system is able to perform its safety function at time t U(t) unavailability function of the system i.e. Figure 1 . A system is defined by the set {M, N, λ}, and a test policy can be either defined by the set {E, t 1 , t 2 , …, t n } or by the set {E, T 1 , T 2 , …, T n }.
General Formulas
For each component, a part with a failure rate equal to E•λ is testable by any partial or full test, and another part with failure rate equal to (1-E)•λ is only testable by the full tests. The corresponding reliability block diagram (RBD) is then given in Figure 2 , and (see proof in Appendix):
The availability function of the system is therefore, (see proof in Appendix):
With the following time-independent sum (see Table I ): The average probabilities of the system failure to perform its safety function on demand, in the time interval between the (i- 1) th and the i th test, and in the full test time interval, are therefore (see proof in Appendix):
When λ•τ is small (i.e. λ•τ << 10 -2 ), the following approximations can be done, using the Taylor's theorem:
( )
Special Case: Without Partial Test
Without partial test, (2), (7), (5), and (9) become:
Table 1 -S(M,N,M) / S(M,N,M+1) / … / S(M,N,N) values for some MooN architectures
Special Case: With Periodic Partial Tests
Partial tests are periodic if (7), (5) , and (9) therefore become: 
APPLICATION
Case Study
A system for oxygen concentration measurement is used as case study. It takes part of an inerting system which aims to reduce the oxygen level in atmospheric air by introducing nitrogen in controlled amounts. The oxygen concentration is maintained below a high level which does not allow the fire breaking out, and above a low level which remains the place accessible to people. To control the oxygen concentration, six oxygen transmitters are used. Because the nitrogen is quickly and heterogeneously distributed into the air space, these six transmitters are assumed redundant. The safety function then consists in detecting a low or a high oxygen level, according to a 2oo6 architecture. Two transmitter test procedures are recommended by the manufacturer:
• Every year: control of the measurements and, if required, followed by adjustment i.e. full test.
• Occasionally: visual inspections and some electronic checks i.e. partial test.
For cost reasons, all the six transmitters are tested together during any test. The basic test policy consists of a full test every year and a partial test every three months.
Figure 3 -PFD for the case study, according to the basic test policy
The first step of the application uses feedback data from the partial and full tests, in order to estimate the transmitter failure rates, and the partial test effectiveness. Then, the probabilities of system failure are assessed according to this basic test policy. Subsequently, the partial test distribution is optimized in order to reduce the PFDavg.
Parameters Estimation and PFD Assessment
During the i th test of each transmitter, the probability to observe a failure is, according to the RBD given in Figure 2 :
Moreover, because a number of components k i among K have been observed in a failed state during the i th test, an intuitive and empirical estimator of Obs i is:
The observations k i follow a binomial distribution. Confidence intervals for the estimations given by (21) and (22) can therefore be obtained using Fisher distributions [16] .
Assuming four installations, each of them using six oxygen transmitters, for a time period equal to four years, the equivalent total number of transmitters observed during each test is thus K=4•6•4=96. A total number of k 1 +k 2 +k 3 =16 transmitter failures have been observed during the partial tests, and k 4 =35 transmitter failures during the full tests. According to (21) and (22), the transmitter failure rate λ is estimated at 6.1 •10 -5 hour -1 , and the partial test effectiveness E at 0.42. According to (16) , equivalent to (5) for periodic partial tests, the PFDavg is then equal to 2.06 •10 -3 . For the present case study, the partial tests have reduced the PFDavg by a factor of five, compared to the result without partial test given by (12) . The probabilities of system failure, according to this basic test policy, are depicted in Figure 3 . 
With the PFDavg as defined by (5) . For the present case study, the optimal partial test time instants and the corresponding partial test time intervals, obtained by solving (23), are reported in Table 2 (last row).
Using this optimized test policy, and according to (5) , the PFDavg is now equal to 1.87 •10 -3 , that is a reduction of about 10% compared to the result with the basic (periodic) test policy. Moreover, further analyses show that the maximum system unavailability in the full test time interval has been reduced by more than 25%. The probabilities of system failure, according to this optimized test policy, are depicted in Figure 4 . 
CONCLUSION
By introducing general formulas for the probability of failure on demand (PFD) assessments of MooN architecture systems subject to partial and full tests, the proposed work provides practical tools for risk management. The neat form of the proposed exact and approximate expressions allows the system and test policy performances to be estimated and optimized quite simply and directly. It has been particularly shown that the average probability of system failure to perform its safety function on demand (PFDavg) can be reduced, just by a better (non-periodic) distribution of an appointed number of partial tests. Thus offering good prospects are for safety improvement without additional cost.
Most of the general assumptions given in Section 2.1 are easily fulfilled when measures are performed to maintain the EUC in a safe state during test and maintenance actions. However, some other aspects should be generalized in order to be applicable to a wider field of applications, as for example:
• Systems with heterogeneous components (i.e. components with different failure rates).
• Systems subject to common cause failures.
• Systems with extended MooN architectures (e.g. MooN architecture parts into each other, capacitated systems).
• Aging systems.
• Stochastic test policies, etc.
Most of these previous cases can be solved using a similar reasoning as proposed in this paper (see Appendix), but make the general formulas sometimes much more difficult to grasp. Another prospect for development concerns the staggered tests which allow for reducing probabilities of system failure by testing the system components at different time instants [17] .
APPENDIX
The following results are for t i-1 ≤ t < t i with i=1, …, n.
• Proof of (1): according to the RBD given in Figure 2 : 
Using the Fubini's theorem:
